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Abstract
This paper considers the e¢ ciency of money creation by banks and the prin-
ciples of the central-bank issuance to improve over it. The ability to issue deposit
liability as a means of payment enlarges banks lending capacities and subjects
them to ercer competition. In circumstances where banks issue too much money,
interest-rate policy may help. In circumstances of a credit crunch, quantitative-
easing policy helps, under which the central bank lends its issues to all banks.
These issues are unbacked by taxation and purely nominal. The optimal quantity
of the central banks lending is unique and implements the rst-best allocation.
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1 Introduction
Banks create money by circulating deposit liability, which is accepted as a means of
payment.1 This function of banks is critical to real economic activities; e.g., very often,
the e¢ cient users of production factors (such as capital, labor) cannot use their own
promises to pay, to obtain some of the factors, and thus, they need a means of payment
to put the factors into e¢ cient production. Do banks create too much or too little
money in equilibrium? If they do, how can the authority, i.e., the central bank (CB
hereafter), improves economic e¢ ciency with its ability to print the outside means of
payment? Addressing these questions, this paper is among the rst attempts to build the
analysis of monetary policy on a general-equilibrium examination of private issuance.
This approach may better our understanding of central banking because the money
that cycles the real economy is issued by both the private banks and the CB. This
paper endogenizes both interest-rate policy and quantitative-easing policy as an optimal
response by the CB to certain situations.
The acceptance of deposit liability as a means of payment, the paper maintains,
comes from the belief that the liability is equivalent to some already-accepted means of
payment, often called cash (such as gold or the CBs issues).2 A key factor that underpins
1Deposit liability may be issued to exchange for the depositorscash (which can thus be lent out
for another round). It may also be directly lent out to borrowers, both historically and nowadays.
Historically, this lending could be done by banks issuing their own notes to a borrower. Nowadays,
when most banks do not print notes of their own, it is done by banks putting a number into a borrowers
deposit account (possibly after having him open one), with a click of mouse. This is usually how lending
is done when the amount lent is big, e.g., mortgages; only rarely do banks disgorge hundred thousands
of dollars of greenback to a mortgage borrower.
2In case of the cash being the CBs issues, a private bank needs to sustain this belief of its deposit
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this belief is that deposit liability can be converted to cash on demand. Banks commit
to this conversion on demand, therefore, in order to get their liabilities circulated as
money. A widespread disbelief in their ability to do so may trigger bank run.
All this thinking leads to a model in which entrepreneurs cannot use their promises
to pay for hiring workers, who, however, accept payment either with the CBs issues,
or with bankersliabilities, which the bankers commit to redeem with the real good on
demand. As a result, to hire workers, entrepreneurs have to borrow either bankersnotes
or the CBs. While the CBs issuance is a policy decision, bankersissuance varies with
the market conditions that they face, which is a¤ected by the CBs policy decision.
The paper considers the e¢ ciency of private money-issuance in the basic model,
where bank run and bank insolvency are assumed to be costless. This assumption
allows for a least-fettered issuance, with which banks possess an unlimited capacity.
Bertrand competition with such a capacity leads to a unique real allocation, which is
the one that would arise if money were not needed for the real economic activities.
Therefore, the least-fettered issuance supplies the real sectors with the exact quantity
of money that they want.3 However, if bankswealth is below a threshold, they fall
insolvent in equilibrium, and this insolvency spurs all their depositors to run to them
for redemption, that is, bank runs arise.4
liability equivalent to the CBs issues, whereas the CB obviously faces no such need, although both
banksliability functions as money.
3This result is in line with the insights of the Banking School in the old debate about systems of
free banking (see Goodhart 1988 Chapter 4) and with those of Hayek (1976).
4Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) and Chari and Jagannathan (1988) also consider bank run that
is triggered by concerns about bank assets instead of by mis-coordination. Goldstein (2010) reviews
empirical evidence for both points of view.
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Bank run is taken as a grave concern to banks in the extension, where it is assumed
to be prohibitively costly. This generates a rich setting to consider central banking.
In the basic model, banks always issue too much because, due to some real friction,
their issues draw more than the rst-best number of workers to entrepreneurs. Now,
in the extension, required to maintain solvency (as to avoid bank run), banks limit
their issuance within a proportion to their wealth. Depending on the aggregate level
of their wealth, they may issue too much or too little. For both situations, this paper
considers how the CB improves e¢ ciency by printing purely nominal claims. In the
situation of a credit crunch, with banks issuing too little money, interest-rate policy,
as bounded by 0 from below, helps nothing. But a policy under which the CB lends
its issues to all banks at a zero interest rate, improves e¢ ciency, because it enlarges
the quantity of money supply and thereby eases a shortage of money which constrains
the real economic activities. The optimal quantity of the CBs lending is unique and
implements the rst-best allocation. In the situation where banks issue too much money,
this type of quantitative-easing policy may only make things worse. A proper interest-
rate policy, however, implements the rst-best allocation if the workersnominal wage
is sticky.5 In that case, a high policy rate pushes up the interest rate of bank lending,
thereby diminishing the real economic activities.
This paper is conceptually based on Kiyotaki and Moore (2001). Unlike the lit-
erature focusing on nancial intermediation,6 this paper considers banks function of
5The introduction of sticky wages would not a¤ect the analysis of the situation of a credit crunch.
6For a good survey of the literature, see Gorton and Winton (2003). Note that this role of money
creation is di¤erent from the role of nancial intermediation between investors and capital users. In this
paper, the real resource that workers "lend" to entrepreneurs is their labor and cannot be deposited;
rather, bankers issue money to combine workers with entrepreneurs into production.
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creating money in a general equilibrium.7 Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013), as in
this paper, consider nancial intermediaries creating money by issuing deposit liability
and emphasize how the low wealth of intermediaries constrains their capacity of this
issuance. They consider moneys value-storing role8 namely, as an asset with a risk
prole di¤erent from capital whereas this paper focuses on moneys role as means
of payment. Moreover, the two papers complement one another by embracing a dif-
ferent facet of monetary policy: theirs considers long-term government bonds, this one
the quantitative-easing policy. Hart and Zingales (2011, 2013) (HZ hereafter), like this
paper, also consider private issuance of money in a transaction role. In their paper,
the issuance of money must be collateralized by the real investment. With this link,
they nd that private issuance entails investment ine¢ ciency. In contrast, this paper
considers uncollateralized bank lending and emphasizes the role of bankswealth. Fur-
thermore, HZ consider scal policy (for the reason explained below), whereas this paper
considers the CBs issuance of purely nominal claims.
In considering the CBs issuance, this paper examines both interest-rate policy and
quantitative-easing policy. Moreover, this examination is built on a general-equilibrium
analysis of private banks circulating their liabilities as a means of payment. These
two features together distinguish this papers model  though it is limited in some
respects from other studies of monetary policy in which moneys transaction role is
7With a search-matching framework, the money-creation role of banks is considered by Cavalcanti
et. al. (1999), Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999), Wallace and Zhu (2007), and Araujo and Minetti (2011),
among others.
8In the papers by Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996) and Freeman (1999a), money including
at money and banknotes plays a similar role, as the saving instruments across di¤erent locations.
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explicitly modeled.9 Stein (2012), as in this paper, considers a variety of policies and
regulations based on an analysis of private banksissuance of money, which is dened
as the riskless liabilities of the banks. Di¤erent from this paper, however, he does not
consider the situation in which banks issue too little money and a quantitative-easing
policy is optimal.
In this paper, quantitative-easing policy works by expanding bankslending capac-
ities, reminiscent of the "credit policy" as classied by Reis (2009). In his model, as
in HZs, the government-provided money is essentially sovereign debt, backed by the
governments power of taxation. Therefore, the monetary policy is intertwined with
scal policy, as it is in other studies on unconventional monetary policy, such as Gertler
and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). In the present paper, by contrast,
what the CB issues is unbacked by taxation and purely nominal, but still circulates in
the nite-period economy. Moreover, unlike in those papers, in the present paper the
quantitative easing policy works not by transferring wealth to banks, but by intensifying
competition between them, which may very likely squeeze their prot.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model,
with costless bank run and bank default. The model is analyzed in Section 3. Section
4, assuming that bank run is prohibitively costly, introduces the central bank. Section
5 presents some discussion. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to Appendix.
9This papers model of money in advance, where money is also privately issued, is reminiscent of
cash-in-advance models, especially, those on working capital, such as Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992;
1995) and Fuerst (1992). For a summary of this literature and other relevant ones, see Walsh (2010).
In addition, Freeman (1996b) endogenizes the discount-window function of the CB, and Williamson
(2012, 2013), and Williamson and Wright (2011) consider monetary policy based on Lagos and Wright
(2005). Williamson (2013), in particular, addresses quantitative-easing policy.
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2 The Basic Model
The economy has one storable good, corn, which is used as the numeraire. There are
three dates, t = 0; 1, and 2. Production occurs at t = 0 and yields output at t = 2; when
all the consumption occurs. There are N bankers, N2 entrepreneurs and N3 workers,
where N is a large number. Thus, bankers are in perfect competition and each serves a
large number of entrepreneurs; and there are more workers than entrepreneurs can hire.
All agents are risk-neutral and protected by limited liability. For convenience, bankers
are referred to as females, entrepreneurs as males.
Workers either produce w kilograms (kg) of corn in autarky, or are hired by entre-
preneurs, who each have h units of human (or physical) capital. If an entrepreneur hires
L workers at t = 0; then his project yields at t = 2
y = eAh1 L;
where 0 <  < 1: Without losing any generality, normalize h = 1: Productivity, eA;
is subject to a common shock. At t = 0; it is common knowledge that eA = A with
probability q and eA = A with probability 1  q. The realization of eA is publicly known
at t = 1. Let Ae  qA+ (1  q)A denote the mean. Assume:
0 < A < Ae: (1)
That is, the negative shock is really severe.
As there are more workers than entrepreneurs can hire, entrepreneurs hire workers
at a real wage of w; what they earn in autarky.
Bankers each have G units of corn, where the unit is dened as N kg and used
wherever bankers are concerned. If there is no friction, bankers are irrelevant to corn
production. What makes bankers important is the following friction of payment.
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Friction 1: entrepreneurs cannot use their promises to pay for hiring workers.10
Workers accept payment with corn, and with bankers promises to pay if these
promises can be converted into corn on demand. At t = 0; bank can thus lend out
either corn, or the paper notes that certify their promises to pay certain amount of
corn; these notes they commit to redeem on demand. They lend out only the notes, and
keep the corn as the reserve ready to meet the demand for redemption at t = 1 when
their loans to the entrepreneurs (which mature at t = 2) yield nothing yet. This model-
ing of notes-lending captures two ways in which banks in real life issue deposit liability
and create money. It obviously captures the direct lending of deposit liability,11 which
Withers (1920, page 24) regarded as "epoch-making." It also captures the essence of the
cycles of loan-deposit-loan that macroeconomics textbooks typically describe: Bankers
may lend only corn to entrepreneurs, who pass it on to the workers hired; the work-
ers, feeling unsafe to store it in their basements, deposit it back to bankers and take
the notes that certify the bankersliabilities to them; then, bankers lend out corn for
another round. The amount certied on a note is the notes face value or par value,
which, this paper assumes, cannot be contingent on the realization of eA: Denote by D
the aggregate face value of a bankers notes.
10Following Kiyotaki and Moore (2001), this friction can be interpreted in two ways. Directly,
it represents a borrowing constraint, arising because workers do not trust entrepreneurs promises.
Alternatively, this friction captures a resale constraint : suppose there are many, say K; types of goods
and each is equally needed for subsistence and produced by N=K entrepreneurs; the workers of an
entrepreneur trust his promise to pay them with his product, but they cannot use this promise for
exchanging other goods, nor can they easily bring his product around for that purpose. This modied
version of the model will deliver results qualitatively the same as the present version.
11For more of its present relevance, see footnote 1.
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Bankers need to take care of two matters: liquidity and solvency. If a banker issues
D > G; she may have the liquidity problem: She is unable to meet the demand for
redemption at t = 1 if she exhausts her reserve, G: In that case, the banker suspends
redemption at t = 1 and reopens for redemption at t = 2 after receiving payments from
the debtor entrepreneurs. As such, G currently represents both bankerswealth and
reserve, but it is the wealth that G really captures, and the reserve plays no role in this
paper, all being claried in Section 5. In addition to this liquidity problem, bankers
may become insolvent, unable to redeem all of their notes at par, if they have issued too
much, with a too big D. Anticipating this possibility of insolvency, workers discount
bankersnotes at t = 0; with a factor of   1. In the basic model, assume that bank
illiquidity and insolvency are costless to handle, therefore do not concern bankers; this
assumption is made to study the least fettered issuance in a competitive circumstance.
Besides the friction of payment, the economy su¤ers another friction.
Friction 2: entrepreneurs are unable to commit on the scale of their projects in
terms of the number of workers they hire.
This friction can be regarded as "real," in the sense that it is unrelated to a means
of payment. Due to this friction, the contract between a banker and an entrepreneur
is not conditional on the scale of the latters project, and as follows. At t = 0, the
entrepreneur borrows the bankers notes of overall face value E, whereby he owes the
banker a debt of E(1+r), which he repays at t = 2 either with corn or with the bankers
notes. Thus, r is the interest rate charged by the banker.
Assume that bankerschoices of (D; r) are publicly observed and that no bankers
issue notes at t = 1; 2:
The timing is as follows.
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Figure 1: Timing of Events
Passing on to the equilibrium, this paper gures out two benchmark allocations.
The First-Best and Second-Best Allocations
E¢ ciency concerns the number of workers allocated to entrepreneurs. Dene the
rst-best allocation as the number of workers at which the social surplus of each project
is maximized. Due to universal risk neutrality and the opportunity cost of labor being
w; the social surplus is AeL   wL; to maximize which, the rst-best allocation is
LFB = (
Ae
w
)
1
1  : (2)
The second-best allocation is dened as the allocation of the competitive equilibrium
if Friction 1 were absent, but Friction 2 stayed  that is, if entrepreneurs could hire
workers with their promises to pay, but their wage o¤er could not be contingent on the
scale of the projects. The equilibrium allocation is as follows.
Lemma 1 The second-best number of workers drawn to entrepreneurs is:
LSB = (
qA+ (1  q)A
w
)
1
1  : (3)
10
Obviously, LSB > LFB.12 This wedge between the two allocations allows for a
circumstance where bankers issue too much money, as will be shown.
3 The Analysis of Competitive Equilibrium
This section analyzes bank issuance in competitive equilibrium: rst the demand of
bankersnotes, then the supply, and, nally, the meeting of the two.
3.1 The Demand Side of the Market for Notes
Consider the entrepreneurs who jointly borrow all of a bankers issues, D; at an interest
rate of r; where (D; r); as will be shown, determines ; the discount factor of the bankers
notes. If the entrepreneurs each borrow face value E of the notes, then, given that the
notes are worth E and the real wage is w; they each hire L workers, where
L = E=w: (4)
At t = 2; these entrepreneurs have the duty to repay the banker in total a value of D(1+
r) (as each ones debt to the banker is 1+r times of what he borrows), with either corn or
her notes. The latter means can be cheaper thus preferred only if the entrepreneurs
default: If they did not default and the bankers notes were discounted, altogether their
demand for the notes would be D(1+ r) (in face value), but the outstanding notes, due
to possible redemption at t = 1; was no more than D; below the demand. Therefore,
either the entrepreneurs need to outlay a real value of E(1 + r) to repay their loans by
12This is because of Friction 2; if entrepreneurs could compete by posting both wage and scale, then
the equilibrium allocation would conform to the rst-best. A full-edged analysis can be found in Wang
(2010).
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any means, or they default. Thus, the decision problem of the entrepreneurs is:
max
E
q(AL   E(1 + r)) + (1  q)max(AL   E(1 + r); 0); s:t:(4): (5)
Lemma 2 Entrepreneurs all default in the bad state: For any (w; ; r), the solution to
problem (5) satises AL < E(1 + r).
Therefore, the entrepreneursborrowing maximizes their prot in the good state,
AL   E(1 + r); and, thus, is
E(; r) = (
A
1 + r
)
1
1  (

w
)

1  : (6)
Then, the amount of the labor they hire and their prot are, respectively,
L(R) = (
A
wR
)
1
1  (7)
V (R) = q(1  )(A
1

wR
)

1  ; (8)
where
R  1 + r

: (9)
So dened, R can be regarded as the real gross interest rate of borrowing: To obtain
a means of payment that is worth 1, an entrepreneur borrows notes of face value 1=;
then in a debt of (1 + r)=: Naturally, real variables L and V depend only on the real
interest, R; and inversely: at a higher real interest rate, the entrepreneurs employ fewer
workers and obtain less prot.
Dene RFB (RSB) by L(R) = LFB (LSB); that is, at R = RFB (RSB); entrepreneurs
hire the rst-best (second-best) number of workers. From (2), (3) and (7),
RFB =
A
Ae
(10)
RSB =
A
qA+ (1  q)A: (11)
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After all bankers have chosen (D; r), entrepreneurs decide which bankers to go to.
In the equilibrium of this subgame, an entrepreneur gets the same expected prot, bV ,
from going to any banker who attracts some entrepreneurs.13 Dene bR by V (R) = bV :
Then, bR can be regarded as the real interest rate that prevails on the notes market,
contingent on all bankerschoices of (D; r):
3.2 The Supply Side of the Market for Notes
Given there is a large number of bankers, a single banker is too small to a¤ect bV ; and
thus takes it as given when choosing (D; r). To attract entrepreneurs, a banker o¤ers
V (R)  bV or, equivalently, R = (1 + r)=  bR: The interest rate r is chosen by the
banker directly. The discount factor, ; is determined by (D; r). It depends on whether
the banker defaults. In the good state, when the entrepreneurs do not default, the
banker has no di¢ culty redeeming her notes. But in the bad state, by Lemma 2, all the
entrepreneurs default, which drags the banker to default if she has issued so much that
her wealth is not su¢ cient to cover the loss, as the proposition below states.
Proposition 1 If a banker chooses (D; r); then,
(i) in the bad state, the value of her loans is
Y =
A(1 + r)
A
D; (12)
and she does not default if and only if
D  (1  A(1 + r)
A
)  G; (13)
13On the one hand, no entrepreneur goes to a banker o¤ering V (R) < bV when he can get bV elsewhere.
On the other hand, if a banker o¤ers V (R) > bV , she induces over-demand for her issues (which is never
optimal), so an entrepreneur coming to her is served with such a probability l that l  V (R) = bV :
13
(ii) the discount factor of her notes at t = 0 is
(D; r) =
8><>: 1, if (13) is satisedq + (1  q)(G
D
+ A(1+r)
A
), otherwise
9>=>; : (14)
Intuitively, in the bad state, the bankers balance sheet is:
Asset Liability
Reserve (G) Equity
Loans to the entrepreneurs (Y ) Liability to the note holders (D)
Table 1: The balance sheet of a banker in the bad state
She does not default if and only if
D  G+ Y ; (15)
which, with Y given by (12), is equivalent to (13).
An intuition for (14) is that a bankers notes are not discounted (i.e.,  = 1) if she
will never default; otherwise, her notes are discounted in the bad state at a factor of
(G+ Y )=D, the quotient of the asset value over the liability.
Having examined the matter of bankers solvency, we now consider the matter of
liquidity. On the one hand, if a banker is known to become insolvent, then she faces a
bank run. The insolvency of the banker means that she cannot redeem all her notes at
par. Therefore, some of them must be discounted. But if a holder of her notes gets to
the banker early enough, before her reserve is depleted, he gets his holding redeemed at
par, su¤ering no discount. Thus, the prospect of insolvency triggers all the note holders
to run to the banker for redemption. On the other hand, if a banker is solvent, then
she has no liquidity problems. At t = 1; a note holder, even if he believes all the other
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note holders are demanding redemption, does not bother himself to go to the banker for
redemption (especially if that incurs a transportation cost): Staying home, he knows
that the banker will suspend redemption today, and, at t = 2; his holding is worth its
par value; therefore, he loses nothing. To bankers, therefore, illiquidity is a problem
resulting from doubt about their solvency.
Now consider bankersdecision problem at t = 0: If a banker chooses (D; r); then
her net prot is q(G+Dr) + (1  q)max(G+ Y  D; 0) G, where the "max" term is
there because the banker may default in the bad state. This net prot, with Y given by
(12), equals
(D; r) = q(G+Dr) + (1  q)max(G  (1  A(1 + r)
A
)D; 0) G: (16)
Taking the real interest rate prevailing on the market, bR; as given, each banker chooses
(D; r) to maximize (D; r), subject to the constraint that she can attract entrepreneurs,
that is,
1 + r
(D; r)
 bR; (17)
where (D; r); the discount factor determined by (D; r); is given by (14). The solution
to this problem depends on bR and is given below.
Proposition 2 The solution to and the value of a bankers problem are:
(i) if bR > RSB; then D =1 and  =1;
(ii) if bR = RSB; then  = 0; and the banker is indi¤erent with to any quantity of
issues, D, with r determined by D through the binding (17);
(iii) if RSB > bR; then lending makes a loss, and thus D = 0 and  = 0:
By the proposition, the prot margin of lending to entrepreneurs is positive if and
only if bR > RSB: For an intuition, note that a banker wants the interest rate, r; as high
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as possible, and, thus, constraint (17) is binding. Therefore, all bankers o¤er R = bR:
What a banker obtains by lending to one entrepreneur, b; is the di¤erence of the social
value of the entrepreneurs project minus his prot from it; that is, b = AeL wL V .
With L and V given by (7) and (8) and R = bR;
b = (A
w
)

1  (qA+ (1  q)A)  bR  11  ( bR RSB): (18)
Therefore, the prot margin of lending, b; is positive if and only if bR > RSB: If the
prot margin of lending is positive, a banker gets  =1 because she has an innitely
large lending capacity (i.e. D = 1); despite her nite stock of corn. This unlimited
capacity is derived from the privilege that bankers can lend out their liabilities.
3.3 The Equilibrium: BankersWealth and Bank Run
In equilibrium, dened below, the prevailing real interest rate, bR; clears the market for
notes. Let N  f1; 2; :::; Ng:
Denition 1 A prole (fDi; ri; i; i; Eigi2N; bR) forms an equilibrium if:
(i) given bR; it is optimal for banker i to choose (Di; ri); which determines i =
(Di; ri) through (14);
(ii) given bankers choices of fDi; ri; igi2N; Ni entrepreneurs go to banker i and
each demand her notes of face value Ei = E(i; ri) given by (6);
(iii) the market clears: Di = iEi
14 and
X
i2N
Ni = N
2:
14Note that D is in the unit of N kg.
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In any equilibrium, bankers neither get an innitely large prot, nor abstain from
lending, which, by Proposition 2, is the case if and only if
bR = RSB: (19)
At this value of bR; entrepreneurs hire LSB workers. Therefore, on the real side, the
equilibrium allocation is unique and is the second-best, namely, the one that would arise
if the friction of payment were absent. This friction, therefore, is completely overcome
by competition under the least fettered issuance. However, on the nominal side, there
is indeterminacy. At bR = RSB; by Proposition 2, the prot margin of lending is 0, and
individual bankers are indi¤erent to any quantity of issues, although in the aggregate
their issues exactly su¢ ce for entrepreneurs to hire LSB workers. This indeterminacy
leads to a continuum of equilibria.
Proposition 3 (i) In any equilibrium, bR = RSB; the prot margin of bank issuance is
0, and the second-best allocation is implemented.
(ii) In any equilibrium, a number of bankers default and thus face a bank run at t = 1
upon the news of eA = A, if and only if bankerswealth is so low as to satisfy
G < [(qA+ (1  q)A)  A](qA+ (1  q)A
w
)

1   GSB: (20)
The prot margin of bank issuance is nullied because bankers engage in Betrand
competition with an unlimited capacity, which arises from the privilege that their lia-
bilities are accepted as money. Therefore, this privilege actually harms bankers under
su¢ cient competition. Moreover, since bankers are indi¤erent to any quantity of issues,
the quantity of inside money circulated in the economy is determined by the real sec-
tors, namely, the sectors of entrepreneurs and workers. Lastly, the aggregate quantity of
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bank issues is xed at a level exactly su¢ cient for entrepreneurs to hire the second-best
number of workers. If bankerswealth, G, is small, then it cannot back the issuance of
this quantity of money without causing default, which triggers bank run, as was noted.
In the basic model, by the proposition, bankersissues always draw to entrepreneurs
the second-best number of workers, which is bigger than the rst-best number. In this
sense, bankers always overissue. To consider central banking in a richer setting, in the
extension, bank run is introduced as a grave concern to bankers. Then, there arises a
circumstance in which bankers issue too little money.
4 Extension: Central Banking
In this section, di¤erent from the basic model where bank run is assumed to be costless,
Assume: Bank run is extremely costly to bankers, who, therefore, disallow it.
The costs of a bank run might be due to the su¤ering of the note holders when they
all run to the banks and possibly queue before their doors overnight. Foreseeing this
su¤ering, workers accept no issues liable to default, which triggers a bank run. This
assumption, therefore, imposes upon bankersdecision problem a no-default constraint,
which, by Proposition 1(i), is:
D  (1  A(1 + r)
A
)  G: (21)
The constraint anchors the lending capacity of a banker (D) to her wealth (G).15 What
15The same purpose could be served by a moral-hazard-related assumption, such as that made by
Getler and Kiyotaki (2010), in which the equity value of a banker (i.e., G+Y  D; see Table 1) should
never fall below G, with  2 (0; 1); otherwise, the banker will abscond with  fraction of her wealth
without being caught.
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happens in equilibrium with the assumption, in the absence of central banking, is sum-
marized below.
Proposition 4 (i) If G  GSB; then in all equilibria bR = RSB; the prot margin of
bank issuance is 0, and L = LSB: If G < GSB; there is a unique equilibrium in which
the prot margin of bank issuance is positive, and bR is determined by G through
G = (
A
w
)
1
1 
1  A
A
bRbR 11   G( bR): (22)
(ii) If G increases (from 0) to GSB; the quantity of issues, D; increases to wLSB; the
real interest rate, bR; decreases (from A=A) to RSB; and the number of workers whom
entrepreneurs hire increases to LSB.
If bankerswealth, G; is beyond GSB; by Proposition 3, bankers are able to issue
enough namely, the second-best quantity of inside money to nullify the prot margin,
without falling insolvent. In equilibrium, therefore, the no-default constraint is not
binding and the second-best allocation is implemented. In the case where G < GSB; the
prot margin of lending is positive because the inadequate wealth of bankers limits their
lending capacity and thereby relaxes competition. The positive prot margin drives all
bankers to issue as much as possible, until the non-default constraint, (21), is binding.
This clears the indeterminacy in the quantity of issues by individual bankers and induces
a unique equilibrium. It also shows that, now, the quantity of money circulated is
anchored by bankerswealth (G), thus determined by the supply side (i.e., the banking
sector), rather than by the demand side, as was in the basic model. Therefore, the lower
the bankerswealth, the less the inside money circulated in the economy and, as a result,
the higher the interest rate of borrowing ( bR) and the fewer the workers entrepreneurs
hire.
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Given G( bR) in (22), dene GFB  G(RFB), the level of wealth at which the real
interest rate reaches the rst-best value. With RFB given by (10), GFB = (Ae  
A)(Ae=w)

1  : Obviously, GFB < GSB: By Proposition 4 (ii), bR > RFB and L < LFB
if G < GFB; while bR < RFB and L > LFB if G > GFB: This depicts two circumstances.
In the former, bankers issue too little money (relative to the rst-best), causing a credit
crunch, while in the latter, bankers issue too much money. The paper consider how the
central bank can improve e¢ ciency in both circumstances.
The central bank (CB hereafter), in this paper, is dened as the unique entity that
can costlessly issue any quantity of another means of payment, called "CB notes." CB
notes, like the issues of a banker, certify the CBs promises to pay a certain amount of
corn, which marks the face values of the notes. However, while a banker commits to
redeem her issues with corn, the CB makes no such a commitment to back its notes.
CB notes, therefore, are purely nominal, but they still circulate in this nite-period
economy. The CB, with its ability to issue another means of payment, can implement
two types of policy, which it announces at t = 0; before bankers choose (D; r).
One is interest-rate policy, under which the CB sets the risk-free interest rate at any
rp  0 by o¤ering a saving asset, as follows. If the CB receives a deposit of some bankers
notes of overall face value F at t = 0, it issues to the depositors CB notes of face value
F (1 + rp) at t = 2. By taking in the notes, the CB becomes a creditor to the issuing
bankers and oblige them together to repay F (1 + rp + ") for some " > 0; either with
corn or with CB notes. The issued CB notes are then valued at par at t = 2: On the
one hand, they can never be valued over par because these debtor bankers can pay the
CB with corn. On the other hand, the notes are not valued under par in equilibrium;
otherwise, they would be cheaper than corn. The debtor bankers would want to use
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only CB notes (and not corn) to clear all their debts. Thus, their demand for CB notes
would be F (1 + rp + ") in face value, but the total supply of the notes is F (1 + rp),
below the demand. However, bankers can escape the punitive interest rate 1+ rp+ " by
paying their note holders the same interest rate of 1+ rp (or even a little more), thereby
keeping them to stay. As a result of the policy rate set at rp, therefore, the holders of
bankersnotes get a net interest rate of rp from t = 0 to t = 2 and bankers, if issuing
notes of aggregate face value D at t = 0; are in a liability of D(1 + rp) at t = 2:
Under the other type of monetary policy, the CB lends a certain quantity of its
notes to all bankers, in order to enlarge their lending capacities. How these notes are
circulated and priced is explained in detail below. This type of policy can be called as
quantitative-easing policy because, by enlarging the quantity of money supply, it eases
the constraints imposed by a shortage of money on the real economic activities.
4.1 The Optimal Monetary Policy if G < GFB
In this circumstance, concerned about insolvency and with low wealth, bankers issue too
little money, causing a credit crunch, with symptoms of a high real interest rate of bank
lending (i.e., bR > RFB) and a small scale of entrepreneursprojects (i.e., L < LFB): As
presently the interest rate for the note holders is already 0 and reaches the lower bound
of the policy rate, no interest-rate policy helps. A proper quantitative-easing policy,
however, restores the rst-best allocation.
Suppose that the CB lends to all bankers each S units of its notes (i.e., of an aggregate
face value of S units corn) at t = 0 and obliges them to pay the same value back at
t = 2; either with CB notes or with corn. Then, at t = 0; bankers lend to entrepreneurs
both their own issues and the borrowed CB notes. Assume that an entrepreneur borrows
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only CB notes or only the bankers issues, but not both of them, in order to avoid the
problem of which debt of the two is senior.16
A loan contract for bankers issues is as in the basic model: If an entrepreneur
borrows from a banker her issues of face value E, then he owes the banker a debt of
E(1 + r), which he repays at t = 2 with either corn or the bankers issues.
A loan contract for CB notes is similar. If an entrepreneur borrows CB notes of face
value Es, then he owes the banker a debt of Es(1 + rs), which he repays at t = 2 with
either corn or CB notes. Assume that even in case of default, the CB notes-borrowing
entrepreneurs still want to pay out as much of their debt as possible, therefore, they try
to buy as close to Es(1+rs) of CB notes as possible. Consider, rst, the case in which S
is in such a range that entails rs > 0 in equilibrium (within which the optimal monetary
policy sits). In this case, all the CB notes are lent out, and the aggregate debt of the
CB notes-borrowing entrepreneurs is S(1 + rs):
CB notes, as mentioned, are not redeemable. They circulate because the CB notes-
borrowing entrepreneurs want to buy them at t = 2 to repay their loans. The price
(or the discount factor) of CB notes at the date, p2; depends on the strength of these
entrepreneursoutput of corn, Ys, relative to the quantity of the CB notes in circulation,
S; and is as follows:
p2 = min(1; Ys=S): (23)
First, p2  1 because the notes can never be valued over par. Otherwise, no notes, but
corn, would be used to repay debts. Second, if Ys  S; then p2 = 1: Suppose, otherwise,
the notes are valued under par. Then, these entrepreneurs would want only CB notes
16That is, when the entrepreneur defaults, should he rst clear the debt with the bankers issues or
that with the CB notes?
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(and not corn) to repay all their debts, S(1 + rs) in total. Their demand for CB notes
in face value would be min(Ys=ps; S(1 + rs)); 17 which, given Ys  S and p2 < 1; is
bigger than S; the supply of CB notes. This argument also shows that if p2 < 1; then
these entrepreneurs default; otherwise, they would buy S(1 + rs) units of CB notes,
which are not available. Lastly, if Ys < S; then obviously p2 < 1: As was argued, the
CB notes-borrowing entrepreneurs default, and thus spend all their output to buy the
notes. Therefore, p2 = Ys=S:
Then, p2 = 1 in the good state, when entrepreneurs do not default. In the bad state,
when entrepreneurs default by Lemma 2, p2 = Ys=S, which, with a calculation similar
to that leading to equation (12), is found equal to A(1 + rs)=(A); this term will be
conrmed to be smaller than 1 in equilibrium. The discount factor of CB notes at t = 0,
s; equals the mean of these discount factors at t = 2: Thus,
s = q  1 + (1  q)  A(1 + rs)
A
:18 (24)
In the bad state, as CB notes are discounted, there is an ination, which plays a key
part for the CB issuance to improve e¢ ciency. In the absence of the CBs intervention,
bankersnotes are made contingent on the realization of eA only through default, which
triggers a costly bank run. Disallowing default restrains bankers to issue only non-
contingent claims, the quantity of which, when bankerswealth is low (below GFB); is
limited, imposing a constraint on the real economic activities. The CB breaks through
17If Ys  S(1 + rs)p2; the entrepreneurs do not default and want only S(1 + rs) of CB notes to clear
their debts. If Ys < S(1 + rs)p2; the entrepreneurs default, but by assumption, they still want to pay
out as much of their debts as possible, and thus spend all their output, Ys; to buy CB notes, inducing
a demand of Ys=p2:
18Alternatively, this equation can be derived from equation (14) by replacing G with 0 (and replacing
r with rs), because CB notes are backed not by bankerswealth, but only by the loans.
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this constraint by o¤ering contingent claims, and they are made contingent through
ination, not through a costly process of default.
The e¤ects of the quantitative-easing policy are summarized below.
Proposition 5 (i) If the central bank lends to each banker S  S(G)  A
q(A A)(G
SB  
G) units of its notes, then there is a unique equilibrium in which the real interest of bank
lending, bR; is determined by S through
S = (
A
w
)
1
1 
1  (1  q)
q
1
1 
  1  (1  q)
q(1  ) G  F ();with  
A
A
bR; (25)
and the interest rate of lending CB notes is
rs =
[qA+ (1  q)A] bR  A
A  (1  q)A bR : (26)
It satises A(1 + rs)=(A) < 1:
(ii) With S increased, bR and rs decrease and the number of workers whom entrepre-
neurs hire, L; increases. At S = S(G); bR = RSB; rs = 0; and L = LSB:
(iii) If G  G  G( 1

RSB); where function G( bR) is given in (22), bankers prot
decreases with S always, and if G < G; it increases with S for S  F ( A
A
 1

RSB) and
decreases with S otherwise.
(iv) The optimal quantity of the CBs lending is S = F ( A
A
 RFB) < S(G) and
implements the rst-best allocation.
Some comments and intuitions are as follows.
First, the quantitative-easing policy a¤ects the real interest rate, bR; thus e¢ ciency,
if and only if bR is above threshold RSB. The "if" part is given by result (ii), which says
that if bR > RSB, the (further) issuance of CB notes (i.e., a bigger S) lowers bR: As for
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the "only if" part, note that by Proposition 2 (iii), by no means can bR be dragged down
below RSB; otherwise bankers would stop lending altogether, not a case in equilibrium.
At bR = RSB; any further issuance by the CB namely, S > S(G) will not increase
the quantity of money circulated, but crowd out the inside money or stay in the vaults
of bankers.
Second, result (iii) states that while the supply of at money always benets en-
trepreneurs by lowering the real interest rate, it may make bankers worse o¤, although
it gives them free funding. This is because the policy enlarges the lending capacities
of all bankers, thus subjecting them to ercer competition. Even when the banking
sector as whole is worse o¤ from the free CB funding, however, an individual banker has
incentives to request it if rs > 0 because she takes prices bR and rs as given and does
not take into account the negative e¤ects of her request on these prices.
Third, the rst-best is achieved with the optimal monetary policy, which, therefore,
helps not only with the friction concerned with the means of payment (i.e., Friction 1),
but also with that concerned with the real economy (i.e., Friction 2).
4.2 The Optimal Monetary Policy if G > GFB
In this circumstance, bankers issue too much money, making the real interest rate too
low and drawing too many workers to entrepreneurs relative to the rst-best allocation.
Quantitative-easing policy, by Proposition 5, may only further lower the real interest
rate and draw still more workers to entrepreneurs, making things worse. Interest-rate
policy, as shown below, has real e¤ects and can implement the rst-best allocation if
and only if the nominal wage to workers is sticky.
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Suppose that the CB sets the policy rate at rp: As a result, the holders of bankers
notes earn a net interest rate of rp; and bankers, if issuing D at t = 0, face a liability of
D(1 + rp) at t = 2: With this amount of liability and the bad-state value of the loans,
Y ; given by (12), bankers stay solvent in the bad state if and only if
D(1 + rp)  G+ A(1 + r)
A
D: (27)
The analysis that follows depends on whether the nominal wage at t = 0 is exible
or sticky. Let us start with the case of exible wages. As bankers do not default and
the net interest rate of holding notes from t = 0 to t = 2 is rp; with exible wages, at
t = 0 workers accept a nominal wage (i.e., a payment with the notes of a face value) of
w=(1+ rp). By borrowing E; an entrepreneur hires E(1+ rp)=w workers. It follows that
with a bankers issues of face value D; L = D(1 + rp)=w workers are hired and that the
discount factor in (4) is now  = 1 + rp; which, with (9), implies R = (1 + r)=(1 + rp):
Substitute R(1 + rp) for 1 + r and wL for D(1 + rp) in (27) and note that the number
of workers hired is L = (A=wR)
1
1  by (7). Then, from (27) it follows:
w(
A
wR
)
1
1  (1  AR
A
)  G: (28)
As all bankers o¤er R = bR, this no-default constraint, when binding, is equivalent
to (22) in Proposition 4. By Proposition 4(ii), the real interest determined by (22) is
above RSB if and only if G < GSB: Moreover, if and only if R > RSB; by Proposition 2,
issuance bears a positive prot margin, which drives bankers to issue as much as possible
so long as they stay solvent, that is, until the no-default constraint, (28), is binding. It
follows that in equilibrium, if and only if G < GSB; constraint (28) is binding and the
real interest is the same as given by (22); and if G  GSB; the real interest rate is RSB
(because it can never fall below RSB by Proposition 2). In both cases, the real interest
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rate, which determines all the other real variables, is the same as given by Proposition
4 as it is in the absence of the CB. Therefore,
Proposition 6 With exible wages, the interest-rate policy has no real e¤ects, but de-
ates the nominal wage to w=(1 + rp).
Now, consider the case of sticky wages, where workers, for some reason, do not accept
a nominal wage below w:19 Then, borrowing notes of face value E; an entrepreneurs still
hires E=w (rather than E(1 + rp)=w) workers. This implies that the number of workers
hired with a bankers issues of aggregate face value D is L = D=w and that the discount
factor in (4) is  = 1; whereby the real interest rate is R = 1+ r: Substitute R for 1 + r
and wL (with L = (A=wR)
1
1  by 7) for D in (27), which then becomes:
w(
A
wR
)
1
1  [(1 + rp)  A
A
R)  G: (29)
This no-default constraint is binding if the prot margin of bank issuance is positive,
as before. Given that the workersreal wage is now w(1 + rp), the prot to a banker
from lending to one entrepreneur becomes AeL   w(1 + rp)L   V . With L and V as
functions of R given by (7) and (8), it equals [A=(wR)]
1
1  [R=RSB   (1 + rp)]:This
prot margin never goes under 0. Therefore,
R  RSB(1 + rp): (30)
19Introducing the constraint of sticky wages would not a¤ect the analysis of quantitative-easing policy
in Subsection 4.1, where workers are paid either with bankersnotes of overall face value w or with the
CB notes of overall face value w=s > w:
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The equilibrium real interest rate is pinned down by conditions (29), (30), and that
if (30) is not binding that is, if the prot margin of bank issuance is positive then
the no-default constraint, (29), is binding. The results are summarized as follows.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the nominal wage to workers is sticky. (i) If the CB sets
the policy rate at rp; then the equilibrium real interest rate of bank lending, R; is as
follows. For G < GSB; R is the root of
1 + rp =
Gw

1 
(A)
1
1 
R
1
1  +
A
A
R  (R) (31)
if rp  rp; otherwise R = RSB(1 + rp); where
rp  [q(A  A)=G]

1 
(qA+ (1  q)A)=w   1;
and rp > 0 if G < G
SB: For G  GSB; R = RSB(1 + rp) for all rp  0:
(ii) The optimal policy rate, which implements the rst-best allocation, is:
rFBp =
8><>: (R
FB)  1 if G  Gs
RFB=RSB   1 if G > Gs
9>=>; ;
where Gs  [(qA+ (1  q)A)  A](Ae=w) 1  and satises GFB < Gs < GSB:
By result (i), with sticky wages, a higher policy rate raises the real interest rate of
bank lending and to no limit. If the policy rate is above rp; bankers get 0 prot, as the
constraint of non-negative prot margin, (30), becomes binding. Bankers cannot pass
all the costs from a high policy rate on to entrepreneurs or keep a xed prot margin,
by charging them a high interest rate r; because the high r diminishes entrepreneurs
demand for bank credit, thus subjecting bankers to ercer competition. With a higher
policy rate, which pushes up the interest rate of bank lending, entrepreneurs get a
thinner prot and hire fewer workers, but the workers hired get a better real wage.
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5 Discussion: Reserve and the Role of G
This section is intended to clarify that bankers stocks of corn, G, which, thus far,
describe both bankerswealth and reserve, essentially represent the former. In clarifying
this, the paper shows that an increase in bankersreserve a¤ects nothing of the results.
Suppose, here and now, that at t = 0; not only bankers have corn, but so do some
workers and that these workers deposit Gw units of their corn with each banker in
exchange for her notes of overall face value Dw. As a result, for each banker, the wealth
stays at G, while the reserve increases to G+Gw: The balance sheet of a banker is:
Asset Liability
Reserve (G+Gw) Equity
Loans to entrepreneurs (Y ) Debt to the holders of notes loaned out (D)
Debt to the initial depositors (Dw)
Table 2: The balance sheet of a banker with increased liquidity coverage
The banker does not default in the bad state if and only if
D +Dw  G+Gw + Y :
When she does not default, her notes are valued at par. Therefore,
Dw = Gw:
Then, in the bad state, the non-default condition becomes
D  G+ Y ;
exactly the same as (15), from which all the subsequent results are derived. It is now
clear that G represents bankerswealth because here their reserve is G+Gw:
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6 Conclusion
Banks create money by circulating their deposit liabilities, which are accepted as a
means of payment (when the bankssolvency is not in doubt). This paper analyzes this
important money-creation function of banks in a general equilibrium. Building on this
analysis, it considers how the central bank can improve economic e¢ ciency by printing
purely nominal claims. It shows how the quantitative-easing policy in a circumstance of
a credit crunch, and the interest-rate policy in a circumstance of two much money issued,
a¤ects e¢ ciency. It determines the optimal monetary policy in each circumstance.
Appendix: The Proofs
Of Lemma 1:
In equilibrium, only one promised wage, denoted by F , prevails on the market, as
will be shown. Competitive equilibrium is thus dened as a prole of (F;L); such that:
(a) Given that F prevails on the market, the optimal labor demand of each entre-
preneur is L;
(b) Given that each entrepreneur demands L workers, F clears the labor market.
The two conditions are elaborated as follows.
For (a): Given F; each entrepreneurs problem of deciding on labor demand is:
max
L
q(AL   FL) + (1  q)max(AL   FL; 0);
where the "max" term appears because the entrepreneur might default in the bad state.
That is indeed the case at the optimum. Otherwise, the entrepreneurs problem is
max
L
q(AL   FL) + (1  q)(AL   FL):
30
The solution is L = (Ae
F
)
1
1  : Then in the bad state his output is A((Ae
F
)

1  ; which
is smaller than F  (Ae
F
)
1
1  ; the wage obligation, because A < Ae as assumed in (1).
Hence, he defaults in the bad state, contradictory to what was supposed.
Defaulting in the bad state, entrepreneurs choose L to maximize the prot in the
good state, AL   FL: Therefore, given F , the labor demand is:
L = (
A
F
)
1
1  : (32)
For (b): As there are a lot more workers than entrepreneurs can hire, the labor
market is cleared by an expected wage income of w; the output of workers in autarky.
In the good state, the workers hired get the promised wage, F: In the bad state, entre-
preneurs default and all the output goes to the workers, each obtaining AL

L
= AL 1:
The expected wage equals w:
qF + (1  q)AL 1 = w: (33)
Equations (32) and (33) together give (3).
Now, show that only one F prevails on the market. If an entrepreneur posts F; then
by (32) he hires L = (A
F
)
1
1  workers, whose wage income is F in the good state and
AL 1 = A
A
F in the bad state. Both increase with F . Therefore, workers go only to
entrepreneurs who post the highest F; and in equilibrium, only one F prevails.
Q.E.D.
Of Lemma 2:
Suppose, otherwise, an entrepreneur does not default in the bad state. Then, his
problem is:
max
E
q(AL   E(1 + r)) + (1  q)(AL   E(1 + r)) s.t. (4):
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From the constraint, E = wL=. Substitute it into the objective and let   w(1+r)=.
Then, the problem becomes
max
L
AeL
   L:
The solution is L = (Ae=)
1
1  : At this scale, the entrepreneur will default in the bad
state: AL < E(1 + r)jE=wL=;w(1+r)= , AL < L , AL 1 < j
L=(Ae=)
1
1  ,
A < Ae; which is assumed in (1) hence a contraction to what was supposed.
Q.E.D.
Of Proposition 1:
(i): As the entrepreneurs all default in the bad state and each hands over his whole
output, y; to the banker, the value of the bankers loans in the bad state, Y ; equals y
times the number of entrepreneurs she nances, D=E: With y = AL; and E and L
given by (6) and (7),
y
E
=
A(1 + r)
A
: (34)
Then, Y = y D=E = D  y=E = A(1 + r)=A D; that is (12). With Y so given, the
condition of no-default in the bad state, Y +G  D; becomes (13).
(ii): By (i), if condition (13) holds true, the banker never defaults and is always able
to redeem her notes at par. Therefore, her notes are valued at par, that is,  = 1; which
gives rise to the upper branch of (14).
If condition (13) is violated, at t = 1; the banker defaults in the bad state. All the
value of her assets, G+ Y ; goes pro rata to the note holders and a note of face value 1
is thus worth (G+ Y )=D; which, with Y given by (12) (note that the derivation of (12)
is independent of whether the banker is solvent or not), equals
G
D
+
A(1 + r)
A
:
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In the good state, when the entrepreneurs do not default and, thus, neither does the
banker, the notes are worth their par values. At t = 0; the value of a note of face value
1, namely, the discount factor of the notes, equals the mean of its value at t = 1 and is
as given by the lower branch of (14).
Q.E.D.
Of Proposition 2:
With rearrangement, the prot of a banker choosing (D; r) is:
(D; r) =
8><>:
qA+(1 q)A
A
(r   rSB)D; if D(1  A(1+r)
A
)  G
qDr   (1  q)G; otherwise
9>=>; ; (35)
where
rSB  (1  q)(A  A)
qA+ (1  q)A = R
SB   1: (36)
Given D, bankers want r as high as possible. Hence, (17) is binding, which implies
r = bR  (D; r)  1: (37)
The Proposition is equivalent to the series of following lemmas.
Lemma 3A: if bR  A
A
; then D =1; r = bR  1, and  =1:
Proof. In this case, a banker chooses D =1; r = bR  1, without default thus  = 1
because 1 + r = bR  A
A
and, thus, the condition for non-default, (13), is honored
for any D; intuitively, at such a high bR, the bank issue can be solely and fully backed
by the loans. At r = bR   1; the prot margin r   rSB = bR   RSB > 0, which implies
 =1:
For the remaining cases in which A=A > bR and thus 1   (1   q)A=(A)  bR > 0;
note that if D(1   A(1+r)
A
) > G namely, if a banker chooses to default then solved
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from (37), with (D; r) given by (14):
r =
qD + (1  q)G
D[1  (1  q)A=(A)  bR] bR  1: (38)
Substitute it into the lower branch of (35), then the prot of a banker who chooses to
default is
( bR=RSB   1)
A  (1  q)A bR [qD + (1  q)G]: (39)
Lemma 3B: if A
A
> bR > A
qA+(1 q)A(= R
SB); then D = 1; r = (qA+(1 q)A) bR A
A (1 q)A bR ,
and  =1:
Proof. In this case, by (37) and   1, 1 + r < bR < A
A
: Thus, 1   A(1+r)
A
> 0:
The non-default condition, (13), is equivalent to D  G(1   A(1+r)
A
) 1. If a banker
chooses not to default, then the quantity of her issues, D, is bounded from above and
she gets a nite prot. But if she chooses to issue D = 1; thus to default in the bad
state, then her prot is given by (39). It follows that  = 1 because bR=RSB   1 > 0
and A   (1   q)A bR > 0 for the range of bR given in the condition. With D = 1;
r = q
bR
1 (1 q)A=(A) bR   1 by (38). Intuitively, with bR > RSB; the prot margin of bank
issuance is positive and bankers want to issue D = 1; thereby obtaining  = 1; but
di¤erently from the case where bR  A
A
; now with a lower bR the issuance of D = 1
cannot be supported by loans only and has to induce default in the bad state.
These two lemmas imply result (i) of the proposition. Result (ii) is proved in the
following lemma.
Lemma 3C: if bR = RSB; then the banker obtains  = 0 and is indi¤erent to any
quantity of issues, D, with r determined by D through equation (37).
Proof. In this case, if bankers choose not to default, so that  = 1, then r = bR   1 =
rSB: Thus, by the upper branch of (35), the coe¢ cient before D; namely, the prot
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margin of issuance, equals 0. The same is true if bankers choose to default because,
then, their prot is given by (39) and the coe¢ cient before D equals 0 too. Therefore,
bankers obtain 0 prot always and are indi¤erent to any D. At any chosen D; the value
of r is determined by (37), with (D; r) given by (14).
Result (iii) is proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 3D: if RSB > bR; then lending to entrepreneurs makes a loss andD =  = 0.
Proof. In this case, if bankers choose not to default, then r = bR  1 < rSB. Hence, the
coe¢ cient before D in the upper branch of (35) is negative, and lending makes a loss.
If bankers choose to default, then their prot is given by (39). The coe¢ cient before D;
as bR < RSB; is now negative also, and lending makes a loss too. Therefore, the optimal
D = 0; whereby  = 0:
The whole proposition is proved. Q.E.D.
Of Proposition 3:
(i): It has been shown in the main text.
(ii): Prove the "if" part by reduction to absurdity. Suppose that in one equilibrium,
no bankers default, namely, (13) is honored for all bankers. Then, for all bankers  = 1
and, thus, by (37), 1 + r = bRjresult (i) = RSB: By (13), each banker issues,
D  G=(1  A
A
RSB)j(11) = G[qA+ (1  q)A]
q(A  A) :
With  = 1 and 1 + r = RSB; by (6) the demand by entrepreneurs is E = (qA + (1 
q)A)
1
1 w
 
1  : IfG < GSB; then the supply is below the demand thus not in equilibrium
because G[qA+ (1  q)A]=[q(A  A)] < (qA+ (1  q)A) 11 w  1  , G < GSB.
To prove the "only if" part, it su¢ ces to show if G  GSB, in the symmetric equilib-
rium, no bankers default. Suppose, for the construction of the equilibrium, that it is the
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case. Then,  = 1: By the analysis above, r = RSB   1 and entrepreneursdemand for
notes E = (qA+ (1  q)A) 11 w  1  , which equals the notes supply, D; in equilibrium.
With this value of (D; r); it is straightforward to check back that if G  GSB; indeed
the non-default condition, (13), is honored and, hence, no bankers default in the bad
state. Q.E.D.
Of Proposition 4:
Note that as there is no default,  = 1 and 1 + r = R:
(i): If G  GSB; by Proposition 3, there is an equilibrium in which no bankers
default in the absence of no-default constraint, that is, the constraint is non-binding.
Therefore, its presence a¤ects nothing of the real allocation, which is thus the same as
in that equilibrium, given by Proposition 3(i), namely, bR = RSB; the prot margin of
bank issuance is 0, and L = LSB:
If G < GSB; note, rst, that in the equilibrium, bR > RSB; otherwise, by Propo-
sition 2, bR = RSB (because in no equilibria bR < RSB; which completely discourages
bank lending), at which to meet the demand for bankersissues entails banker default,
disallowed here. Second, with 1 + r = R; no-default constraint (21) becomes
D  G(1  A
A
R) 1: (40)
Third, as bankers do not default, their prot is given by the upper branch of (35), which,
as r   rSB = ( bR  1)  (RSB   1) = bR RSB; becomes qA+(1 q)A
A
(R RSB)D.
A bankers problem is now
max
D;R
(R RSB)D; s.t. (40) and R  bR:
As bR > RSB; at the maximum, both constraints are binding. Therefore, the supply of
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bankersnotes is
D =
G
1  A bR=(A) : (41)
Intuitively, taking the positive prot margin (which is in proportion to R   RSB > 0)
as given, bankers issue as much as possible, until the non-default constraint, (40), is
binding.
The equilibrium real interest rate, bR; is found by equalizing this supply of bankers
notes to the demand, given by (6). With 1 + r = bR and  = 1; this equalization gives
rise to (22):
G = G( bR)  (A
w
)
1
1   1 
A
A
bRbR 11  :
It is straightforward that G0( bR) < 0; G(RSB) = GSB and G(A=A) = 0: Therefore, for
any given G < GSB; equation (22) determines a unique bR 2 (RSB; A=A); which, by
(41), determines a unique D: Hence, the equilibrium uniquely exists.
(ii): Let bR(G) be the inverse function of G( bR): Then, in the equilibrium bR = bR(G):
As G( bR) is decreasing, so is bR(G). Moreover, bR(GSB) = RSB and bR(0) = A=A because
G(RSB) = GSB and G(A=A) = 0: By (22) and (41) together, D = (A= bR) 11 w  1  ;
which decreases with bR; therefore increases with G: With R = bR for each banker, the
number of workers hired in equilibrium, by (7), is L = (A=w bR) 11  ; which decreases
with bR: Thus, L increases with G. Moreover, L = LSB at G = GSB, where bR = RSB.
Q.E.D.
Of Proposition 5:
(i) The equilibrium is characterized as follows. Entrepreneursdemand for CB notes,
Es; solves the same problem as the demand for bankersnotes, given by (5), except that
r is replaced with rs and  with s. Therefore, the real interest rate of borrowing CB
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notes is (1 + rs)=s, while the real interest rate of borrowing bankersnotes is 1 + r
(since  = 1 given that bankers do not default). By (8), only the real interest rate of
the borrowing concerns the entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, as made clear later, lending
of both means of payment bears a positive prot margin and thus both are lent out.
Then, the real interest rate of lending the two are equalized, and, as before, equal to bR:
1 + rs
s
= 1 + r = bR: (42)
As the prot margin of lending is positive, bankers issue notes to the point at which
the no-default constraint becomes binding, that is, D = G=(1   A
A
bR); and also they
lend out all the CB notes, S. The aggregate value of these means of payment supplied,
sS +D; when the market clears, equals the wage payment that entrepreneurs demand
to hire workers:
wL = sS +
G
1  A bR=(A) ; (43)
where, by (7), the number of workers hired is
L = (
A
w
)
1
1  bR  11  : (44)
These four equations (note 42 has two) together with equation (24) (which settles
s); as shown below, determine a unique prole of (s; rs; r; bR;L) in equilibrium thus,
the equilibrium exists uniquely. Passing on to show that, we derive equations (25) and
(26). By ( 42), 1 + rs = bRs: Substituting it into (24) and rearranging, we have:
s =
q
1  (1  q)A=(A)  bR: (45)
Substitute it and (44) into (43)), rearrange, let   A=(A)  bR, and we come to (25):
S = (
A
w
)
1
1 
1  (1  q)
q
1
1 
  1  (1  q)
q(1  ) G  F (): (46)
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Equations (42) and (45) together imply 1 + rs =
q bR
1 (1 q)A=(A) bR , from which (26)
follows.
Now, come to show that for S  S(G); equation (46) determines a unique bR (which
determines a unique rs, r, L, and s); and that this bR decreases from bR(G) to RSB
when S runs from 0 to S(G); where bR(G) is the inverse function of G( bR) given by
(22) in Proposition 4, namely, the equilibrium real interest rate without central-bank
intervention. Both assertions follow from the following three observations. First, F 0() <
0; therefore, ; and thus bR; decreases with S: Second, equation F () = 0 is equivalent
to (22), thus leading to bR = bR(G). Therefore, at S = 0; bR = bR(G): And third,
F ( A
A
RSB) = S(G), therefore, bR = RSB at S = S(G):
Lastly, A(1 + rs)=(A) < 1, 1 + rs < A=Aj(26) , q bR=[1  (1  q)A=(A)  bR] <
A=A, bR < A=Aj bR< bR(G) ( bR(G) < A=A; which is a¢ rmed by Proposition 4(ii).
(ii): It was shown above that bR decreases with S and equals RSB at S = S(G): By
(26), rs increases with bR and rs = 0 at bR = RSB: Therefore, rs decreases with S and
equals 0 at S = S(G).
(iii): In the unique equilibrium, each banker serves N entrepreneurs and obtains
from each of them b; given by (18), thus Nb overall. Note that b increases with bR for
bR 2 [RSB; 1

RSB] and decreases with it for bR > 1

RSB: The result then follows from the
fact that bR  bR(G)  1

RSB for any S  0 if G  G( 1

RSB) and that bR = 1

RSB at
S = F ( A
A
 1

RSB) if G < G( 1

RSB).
(iv): As G < GFB; bR(G) > RFB > RSB. Note that bR = bR(G) at S = 0 and
bR = RSB at S = S(G): Therefore, there is a unique S between 0 and S(G) at which
bR = RFB and this S equals F ( A
A
RFB) by (25).
Q.E.D.
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Of Proposition 6:
It is proved in the main text.
Of Proposition 7:
(i): As was said, the real interest rate in equilibrium is determined by three condi-
tions: (29); (30); and if (30) is not binding, then (29) is. Note that (30) is equivalent
to
1 + rp  R=RSB (47)
and (29) is equivalent to
1 + rp  (R); (48)
where (R) is dened in (31):
(R)  Gw

1 
(A)
1
1 
R
1
1  +
A
A
R:
Then in equilibrium, (48) and (47) hold, and one of them must be binding.
The binding constraint is the one that is tighter, namely that with a smaller value
on the right hand side. Let (R)  (R)  R=RSB for R  0: Then (R) = 0 has two
roots: 0 and
R =
A
w
[
q(A  A)
G
]
1 
 :
R  RSB if and only if G  GSB: Because 0(0) < 0;  < 0 for R 2 (0; R) and  > 0
for R > R:Moreover, let rp  R=RSB 1 = [q(A A)=G]

1 
(qA+(1 q)A)=w 1,
which, by the denition of R; also equals (R)   1: Finally, as rp  0; R  RSB by
(47).
Consider rst the case where G < GSB. In this case, RSB < R: By the denition of
R, for R 2 [RSB; R);  < 0; and thus (R) < R=RSB; therefore, (48) is binding. For
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R > R;  > 0; and thus (R) > R=RSB; therefore, (47) is binding. R increases with
rp; and at R = R; rp = r

p; no matter which of (47) and (48) is binding. Therefore,
R < R if rp < r and R > R if rp > r: It follows that if rp < r; (48) is binding, giving
rise to 1 + rp = (R) and if rp > r; (47) is binding, giving rise to R = RSB(1 + rp):
Consider then the case where G  GSB; and thus RSB  R: For all R  RSB
(namely, all the possible equilibrium values of R), R  R: Then, always,  > 0; and
thus (R) > R=RSB. Therefore, (47) is binding, giving rise to R = RSB(1 + rp):
(ii): There exists a unique policy rate under which R = RFB and the rst-best
allocation is implemented: by Proposition 4, at rp = 0 (namely, without intervention by
the CB), R < RFB because now G > GFB; by result (i), R increases with rp to innite;
therefore, there exists a unique rp under which R = RFB. To nd this rp, it su¢ ces to
nd the inverse function of R(rp) given by result (i). This inverse function is that for
G < GSB; rp = (R)  1 if R   1(1+ rp) = R and rp = R=RSB   1 otherwise, while
for G  GSB; rp = R=RSB   1 always. R > RFB if and only if G < Gs: Therefore,
RFB falls in the domain of function (R)  1 if G < Gs, otherwise it is in the domain of
function R=RSB   1. Hence, the optimal policy rate, rFBp ; equals (RFB)  1 if G < Gs
and RFB=RSB   1 otherwise. It is straightforward to check GFB < Gs < GSB:
Q.E.D.
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